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Many policy makers and farm advocates have become increasingly concerned that 
contracts used in agricultural production or procurement may be unfairly biased in favor 
of large food processors at the expense of growers.  In response, lawmakers in various 
states have proposed legislation designed to regulate the contracting process.  For 
example, the Producer Protection Act of 2000 contains a list of regulations designed to 
protect growers and to provide them with bargaining power in the event that they are 
treated unfairly by large food processors.
2  Among these regulations are rules that protect 
growers from undue termination or non-renewal of contracts by providing growers with 
the right to be “….reimbursed for damages incurred due to the termination, cancellation, 
or failure to renew. Damages shall be based on the value of the remaining useful life of 
the structures, machinery or equipment involved.” 
One rationale for this regulation is that processors often offer short term contracts 
to farmers while requiring farmers to make substantial investments in new production 
facilities in order to secure a contract.  These investments can take years to payoff while 
farmers are often given only short term contracts with no written guarantee of renewal.  
While non-renewal of short term contracts does not necessarily constitute a breach of 
contract, it nevertheless can leave growers with huge debts.  For example, a recent 
Associated Press news article reported that some hog farmers in Arkansas, who did not 
have their contracts renewed, have appealed to the courts on the basis that there is a 
“breach of faith”.  That is, even though there is no breach of contract, verbal 
commitments were made which induced growers to invest substantial capital into new 
equipment and housing facilities. While many states have proposed or passed legislation 
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the producer protection act in its entirety.    2
which restricts termination, or non-renewal of contracts, relatively few economic studies 
of these regulations have been undertaken. 
In this paper, we provide an economic analysis of breach damages in a dynamic 
agency model where there is asset specificity and the potential for contract termination 
between periods.  Specifically, we examine the impact of government mandated damages 
that compensate growers for contract-specific investments when growers are terminated 
without cause.  Our paper makes a contribution to the small but growing literature on 
contract regulation, which is becoming an important issue at both the state and national 
levels, as contracting becomes more important and various policy makers and farm 
advocacy groups have become more vocal about alleged abuse of growers by large 
processors and integrators.  While many agricultural economists have examined 
regulations related to tournament contracts (Leegomonchai and Vukina; Levy and 
Vukina; Tsoulouhas and Vukina; Roe and Wu; Wu and Roe) and limits to termination of 
growers in contracting relationships (Lewin), we are unaware of any economic analyses 
of breach damages that compensate growers who are unduly terminated.   
Our two period principal agent model allows us to clarify the relationship between 
termination, asset specificity and moral hazard efficiency and how government regulation 
may impact the ability of processors to discipline agency problems.   We show that asset 
specificity combined with the ability to terminate growers between contracting periods 
can serve as effective instruments for disciplining moral hazard thereby enhancing 
efficiency.  On the other hand, the use of such instruments often creates other 
distortionary effects, and can leave growers vulnerable.  We show, however, that breach 
damages designed with the intention of protecting growers may not necessarily improve   3
grower welfare and can lead to additional distortions that can reduce social welfare by 
reducing the ability of contractors to manage moral hazard.  This can reduce the 
effectiveness of contracts in facilitating production efficiency and lead to a decrease in 
the development of value added products.   We conclude our article by discussing 
possible alternatives to breach damages that might enhance grower welfare.  
Preliminaries 
Our economic analysis is based on a two period principal agent model between a risk 
neutral contractor (e.g. processor) and a risk neutral agent who faces a limited liability 
constraint which limits the extent to which the processor can “punish” the agent for poor 
performance via low or negative payments.  Limited liability models are easier to solve 
and generalize than models of moral hazard with risk aversion and at the same time, do 
not trivialize the moral hazard problem as would be the case with risk neutrality and 
unlimited liability.
3  Like the risk aversion model of moral hazard, the limited liability 
model imposes a tradeoff; namely, the tradeoff between incentive provision and limited 
liability rents.  This is analogous to the tradeoff between risk premiums and incentives 
facing the contract designer in the risk aversion model of moral hazard and qualitative 
predictions are similar.  Finally, limited liability models are appealing in that many real 
world contracts do not include explicit payment terms that allow for unlimited 
punishment via negative or even positive, but low payments.   
We assume that the principal is interested in producing one unit of a downstream 
product to be sold to consumers.  The principal can either produce a generic good or a 
differentiated, value added good.  Denote the revenue functions for the differentiated and 
                                                 
3 It is well known that without limited liability, a simple solution to the moral hazard problem is to just 
make the agent the residual claimant and first best can be achieved.    4
the generic good by R and r, respectively where R r ≥ .  Also assume that whether R is 
strictly greater than r or not depends on the quality of the input being used.  That is, 
assume that in order to produce the differentiated product, the principal must use a high 
quality input.  Assume that one unit of the downstream product requires one unit of an 
input good, which can take on two quality values denoted by yH and yL, where  H L yy > .  
Then we have the following key assumptions:   () () H L R yr y >  and 
() () () L HL R yr yr y ==  
Because the revenue function for the generic good does not vary with input 
quality, we will just denote it by r.  Also, note that producing the differentiated product 
requires that the principal source a high quality input.  Therefore, a key reason why the 
principal wants to contract is to be able to coordinate the production process so that it can 
provide adequate incentives in the event that it chooses to produce the differentiated 
good.    
  We also highlight additional features/assumptions of our model:   
1.  The principal and agent can contract with each other for two periods, where the 
principal can terminate the relationship after the first period.   
2.  The principal can terminate the relationship either because the grower did not 
perform up to expectations (for-cause-termination) or because exogenous 
economic events lower the expected profitability of continuing the contract in the 
second period.   
3.  Agent’s action space is defined by  [0, ] Ε =+ ∞  in both periods so that so  t e ∈Ε is 
continuous.  Action is also unobservable by the principal so that there is moral 
hazard.   5
4.  Agent’s effort cost function is given by  ( | ) t ce I  with assumptions,  (0| ) 0 cI = , 
(| )0 et ceI> ,  (| )0 ee t ceI > , and is stationary across periods.  The variable I 
denotes an investment (in dollars) that the grower must make in order to secure a 
contract from the processor.  We assume that  ( | ) 0 It ceI≤ , ( | ) 0 II t ceI > , 
(| )0 eI t ceI ≤ , and   ( | ) 0 eII t ce I > so that the investment improves the grower’s 
ability to farm by lowering the absolute and marginal effort costs but there are 
diminishing benefits to additional investments.  Finally, we assume that the 
investment has a useful life of two periods. 
5.  The investment I is relationship specific in that it is worth only  I λ  in an 
alternative use or in an alternative contracting relationship where  [0,1] λ∈ .  When 
1 λ =  there is no asset specificity and when  0 λ = , the asset is completely specific 
to the relationship. 
6.  Define the following output probabilities: 
a)   ( ) Pr { | } tt H t p eo b y e =   
b) 1 ( ) Pr { | } tt L t p eo b y e −=  
Also assume that output is independently distributed across periods so that first 
period quality outcomes reveal no information about second period quality 
outcomes. 
4 
6. Assume that the probability function satisfies the following conditions: 
                                                 
4 We allow for only two output levels to avoid overcomplicating the model.  Had we allowed for three or 
more output levels, then we would need to impose additional conditions on the conditional probability 
distributions such as the monotone likelihood ratio condition and the convexity of the distribution function 
condition (See Grossman and Hart).    6
 













7. The principal and the agent are risk neutral and have static payoffs of: 
[ ] [ ][ ] () ( ) 1 () ( )
p
t t tH th t tL tL pe Ry w pe ry w π =− + −−  
[ ] () 1 () (|)
A
tt t H t t L t p ew p e w c e I π =+ − −  
in period t, where  tH w  and  tL w  are contract payments made to the agent under 
high and low performance, respectively.   To conserve on notation, we will let 
() tL rr y =  and  ( ) tH R Ry = . 
8.  Assume limited liability so that wtH ≥ L and  wtL ≥ L, where L represents a lower 
bound on explicit payments contained in a contract.  This makes the risk neutral 
problem non-trivial. Recall that with risk neutrality, first best is always achievable 
by making the agent the residual claimant.  However, when there are limited 
liability constraints, then the problem is no longer trivial as the principal now is 
forced to consider the tradeoff between higher effort and limited liability rents. 
9.  The timing of the relationship is as follows: 
Period 0:  The principal (P) offers a single period contract to the agent (A).  If A 
accepts, A must make the investment, I , as required by P.  
Period 1:  A exerts effort e1 which affects the probability distribution of quality.  
Subsequently, quality, y1k is realized and a payment w1k is made to the agent 
where k = L, H.   
  Period 2:  At the beginning of the period, P decides whether or not to continue the  
relationship with A.  If the contract is renewed, A exerts effort e2 and y2k is    7
subsequently realized.  After observing y2, the payment w2k is made to the agent. 
  
Periods 1 and 2 are linked as follows.  At the conclusion of period 1, the principal 
decides whether to renew the contract or not with the agent using one of two criteria.  
First, if the agent did not perform well, that is, if  1 L yy = , then the principal does not 
renew the contract.  Second, an exogenous economic event can affect the downstream 
market for the principal so that the principal may no longer find it profitable to continue 
its operations, in which case it would “layoff” the grower.
5  In the first case, the processor 
has a legitimate reason for terminating the grower, whereas in the second case, the 
processor essentially breaches its agreement with the grower, despite the fact that the 
grower performed well.  While there is formally no long term agreement in our model, 
verbal agreements, which induced the grower to make the long term investment, I, may 
be enforceable by a court of law because the grower can sue for “breach of faith.”  
First Best 
In a first best world with no moral hazard or asset specificity, define the second period 
surplus from trade by: 
(1)   22 2 2 (| ) () ( 1 () ) (| ) Se I pe R pe r ce I =+ −− 
Taking the derivative with respective to effort and assuming an interior solution yields 
the first order condition: 
(2)  [ ] 22 () (|) e p eR rc e I ′ −=  
Letting 
*
2 e  be the effort level that satisfies (2), we have, 
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22 2 2 (| )m a x () ( 1 () ) (| )
e Se I pe R pe r ce I =+ − −  




11 1 1 ( |) m a x() ( 1 () ) (|)
e Se I pe R pe r ce I =+ − −  
where 
*
1 e  satisfies the first order conditions: 
(5)  [ ] 11 () (|) e p eRr c e I ′ −=  
To determine optimal investment, we maximize the time 0 objective function with 
respect to I.  However, before formulating the two period objective function, we allow for 
the possibility that an exogenous economic shock may affect second period surplus so 
that it may be negative in certain contingencies in which case it would be optimal for no 
exchange to take place in period 2.  Define 
*
2 Pr ( ( | ) 0) qo b S e I = ≥ , then the expected 
surplus function at time zero is: 
(6) 
**
12 max ( | ) ( | )
I Se I q Se I I δ +−  
where δ is a common discount factor.  Again, assuming an interior solution, the first 
order condition is: 
(7) 
**








so that optimal investment I* satisfies (7).  Note that conditions (2), (5) and (7) 
characterize the first best conditions for effort and investment when there is no moral 
hazard and no asset specificity. 
Optimality Conditions with Moral Hazard and Asset Specificity 
Now we will characterize the optimality conditions when there is moral hazard so that 
first best may not be achievable.  In this case, the principal must design a contract that   9
will provide the agent with incentives to exert adequate effort.  Also, it is a stylized fact 
that in some sectors, such as processing tomatoes and chicken broilers, long term 
contracts are rarely offered so that trade is governed by a sequence of short term 
contracts.  As such, we model our two period contracting relationship by assuming that a 
contract lasts for only one period and then the principal has the option of renewing 
depending on the agent’s performance and/or exogenous economic conditions.    
  We solve the model through backward induction starting in period 2.  Because 
this is the final period, the principal essentially is designing a static contract to motivate 
the agent to exert high effort.   That is, the principal must solve: 
(8)  [ ] [ ]
22 2
22 22 ,; max ( ) (1 ( ))
hL
H L wwe p eR w p e r w −+ − − 
 s.t.    [ ] 22 2 2 22 2 () 1 () (|) ( )
AA
HL p ew p e w c e I I π πλ =+ − − ≥    (IR) 
   [ ] 22 2 2 () (|) HL e p ew w c e I ′ −=       (IC) 
   2H wL ≥   2L wL ≥       ( L L )  
where  2 ()
A I π λ  represents the agent’s reservation profit or next best contracting 
opportunity.  When the limited liability constraint (LL) is binding, then w2L = L, which 
limits the degree to which the principal can deliver incentives by “punishing” the agent 
via low payments.  Instead, the principal is forced to use only carrots to motivate the 
agent to exert high effort and has to pay the agent rent via a high w2H to ensure that there 
is adequate variation between  2H w and w2L.  Because the principal is forced to pay 
excessive high  2H w , the IR constraint is not binding and the agent earns rents over her 
next best opportunity.   






















 represents the size of the spread between the high and low payments 
and (9) gives us the optimal payment to the agent when  22 H yy = .  The incentive cost 
function for the principal is given by: 
(10) 
2
22 2 2 2 2
2
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> 2 (| ) ce I  
The proof for the last inequality can be found in Wolfstetter (pg. 290) and suggests that, 
under moral hazard, it becomes more costly to implement a particular effort level than 
when moral hazard does not exist.  This is because the principal must provide limited 
liability rents to the agent in order to get the agent to exert high effort.  The incentive cost 

















Note that (11) is analogous to (1) with the exception that the effort cost function is 
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we know that 
*
22
s ee <  because  22 (| )
IC Cc e I >  so that optimal second period effort under 
moral hazard is less than first best effort.   We can then define second period payoffs for 
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Having determined the second period payoffs, we can now examine behavior in period 1.  
However, we first remind the reader that we allowed for the possibility that an exogenous 
shock can create negative second period surplus.  Note that 
*
2 (| ) Se I > 22 (| )
Ps eI π  so that 
the principal may earn negative profits sometimes even when first best surplus is greater 
than zero.  This suggests that, due to moral hazard, the principal may sometimes breach 
the contract with a grower even if first best surplus is positive.  Letting 
22 Pr ( ( | ) 0)
Ps vo b e I π =≥ , then we know that v < q.   
  At the beginning of period 1, the principal’s expected profit will depend on both 
1 () p e  and v as these probabilities determine the likelihood that the principal will continue 
to contract with the same grower in the second period.  Specifically, if a grower 
underperforms by producing low quality, which can occur with probability  1 1( ) p e − , 
then the processor will terminate this grower and contract with another grower and earn 
profits 
p
A π− .  However, even if the grower performs well, economic conditions can be 
unfavorable so that the principal still terminates the grower after period 1 with probability 
v.  Thus, the principal’s first period objective function is: 
(15)  11 1 2 2 1 1 () ( |) ( 1 () )
pp s p
H LA pe R w v e I pe r w v πδ π δ π −    =− + + −− +     
The agent’s ex ante profit function in period 1 is: 
(16)
11 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 () ( |) ( 1 ) ( ) ( 1 () ) ( ) (|)
AA s A A
H L p ew v e I v I p e w I c e I πδ π δ π λ δ π λ    =+ + −+ −+ −       12












wL v e I I
pe
δπ πλ  =+ − −  ′
 
Comparing (17) to (9), one can see that the threat of termination along with asset 
specificity, as captured by  22 2 (| ) ()0
As A eI I ππ λ − > , allows the principal to charge a lower 
incentive compatible payment to the agent when the agent produces high quality.  If asset 
specificity did not exist, then the implicit incentives offered by the threat of termination 
would carry no weight and the principal would not be able to lower its payment to the 
agent.  Note that the greater the asset specificity, the large the term  22 2 (| ) ()
As A eI I π πλ −  







As A e ceI
ve I I
p e
δπ πλ  −≥  ′
, then  11 H L wL w = =  in which case 
there would be no contingent pay whatsoever.  The producer would be offered a fixed 
payment contract and effort would be motivated entirely by implicit incentives from the 
threat of termination.   
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pe
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Formally, the above points can be summarized as follows: 
PROPOSITION 1: Asset specificity combined with the threat of termination create 
implicit incentives, which,   13
i)  allow the principal to reduce payment w1H to the agent by an amount 
equal to  22 2 (| ) ()







As A e ceI
ve I I
p e
δπ πλ  −≤  ′
; 







As A e ceI
ve I I
p e
δπ πλ  −≥  ′
 because explicit incentives are 
crowded out by implicit incentives; 
iii)  enable the principal to implement a higher effort level than what is 
possible under an explicit contract in a one-shot relationship with moral 
hazard.  
In a paper by Andreoni, et. al. it was shown that optimal incentives are provided by both 
reward and punishment.  Under limited liability, explicit punishment cannot be imposed 
on agents so that other instruments have to be in place.  Asset specificity and termination 
are instruments that can be used to provide implicit punishment to growers.   
  Using (18), the principal’s ex ante first period objective function can be written 
as: 
(19) 




(| ) () ( 1 () ) () (| )( 1 ()
()(|)
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11 1 argmax ( | )
P
e
ee I π =   
which represents the optimal first period effort level implemented by the principal with 
moral hazard and asset specificity.     14
Breach Damages 
Suppose that legislation is introduced which protects growers from undue termination 
when they have made large investments in new equipment and buildings in order to 
obtain a contract.  For example, the Producer Protection Act contains a clause that gives 
growers the right to recover damages that are based on “…the value of the remaining 
useful life…” of the equipment and buildings.   However, with asset specificity, it is 
difficult to interpret exactly what this means particularly when asset specificity is severe.  
For example, consider the extreme case where λ = 0 so that the investment I is entirely 
asset specific.  In this case, if the grower is terminated, there is no useful remaining life to 
the asset because the asset is completely worthless outside the currently relationship. 
  One can also interpret the “value of the remaining useful life” to mean the 
additional amount of profit that the grower could have earned had the grower not been 
terminated.  In this case, damages would be calculated to be the difference between 
profits that can be earned with the current processor and profits from the next best 
opportunity in period 2.  That is, we have: 
(21)  22 2 (| ) ()
As A De I I π πλ =−  
which is the real amount that the grower loses from being terminated.    
  We also assume that the grower will be awarded damages if he/she performed 
adequately and is terminated anyways.  If the grower performed poorly, then the 
processor has justification for terminating the grower and it is reasonable to assume that a 
court of law would agree with the processor’s reasons for termination.  As such, the 
processor and grower’s new ex ante period 1 profit functions are: 
(22)  11 1 2 2 1 1 () ( |) ( 1 ) ( 1 () )
pp s p
H LA pe R w v e I vD pe r w v πδ π δ δ π −    =− + − − + −− +       15
(23)
( ) 11 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 () ( |) ( 1 ) ( ) ( 1 () ) ( ) (|)
AA s A A
H L p ew v e I v I D p e w I c e I πδ π δ π λ δ π λ   =+ + −+ + −+ −  
 












wL v e I I v D
pe
δπ πλ δ  =+ − − − −  ′
 
Equation (24) defines the optimal payment the principal makes to the agent when high 
output is observed under breach damages.  While damages ostensibly impose a cost on 
the principal when the principal terminates the contract with the agent without cause, our 
model predicts that the principal indirectly passes this cost on to the agent via a lowering 
of w1H by the amount  (1 ) vD δ − .  Thus, the entire discounted expected damages are 
transferred to the agent so this regulation has no impact on grower welfare.  Formally, we 
have, 
 
PROPOSITION 2:  If the government imposes breach damages on the principal, neither 
grower welfare or effort level implemented by the principal will be affected. 
 
An additional implication of Proposition 2 is that damages are non-distortionary which 
suggests that breach damages will not affect social surplus.  However, the assumptions 
under which Proposition 2 holds are rather restrictive as it is unlikely that the principal 
can transfer the expected cost of breach damages to growers without bound.  Recall that 
the limited liability constraints prevent w1H from falling below L so that if breach 
damages and/or asset specificity are large, then the principal will not be able to pass all   16
regulation costs to the agent via a reduction in w1H.  To see this, consider the following 
two cases. 
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ve I I v D
pe
δπ πλ δ  ≤− + −  ′
 
which, combined with (24),  implies that  1H wL >  when breach damages are not imposed 
by the government but  1H wL =  after damages are implemented.  A government statute 
requiring processors to pay damages in the event of breach may actually reduce or 
eliminate explicit contingent pay.  The intuition is that the processor will try to pass the 
expected costs of the damage liability to the grower by reducing  1H w  but at some point 
the processor is constrained by the limited liability constraint so the processor has to 
absorb some of the liability costs, which also reduces the power of implicit incentives.  
Without contingent pay (no explicit incentives) and with implicit incentives weakened, 
the principal now faces higher incentive costs.   
 







As A e ceI
ve I I
pe
δπ πλ  ≤−  ′
 
In this case,  1H wL = , even without damages so if the government imposes damages, the 
processor cannot pass on the expected liability to growers via reduced explicit payments.  
  
The above two cases lead to our third proposition.    17
PROPOSITION 3: Assume that the conditions specified in Case 1 or Case 2 hold.  If the 
government imposes breach damages on the principal, then the cost of managing first 
period moral hazard will increase for the principal, resulting in a distortion whereby  
first period effort will be distorted downward away from  1 e  . 
 
  Proposition 3 states that government policy can create distortions if either asset 
specificity is severe and/or damages are large.  The implication here is that, while asset 
specificity can make growers extremely vulnerable in short term contracting 
relationships, it is precisely in such environments that regulations might be highly 
distortionary.  Thus, policy makers seeking to protect growers from undue termination 
face the tradeoff between decreased grower vulnerability and increased agency costs that 
may diminish the ability of processors to manage moral hazard.  Moreover, if excessive 
regulation is imposed via large breach damages, it is possible that processors may be 
handcuffed in their ability to maintain quality in their production chains which could 
reduce product innovation that require unique inputs.   
Discussion and Conclusion 
The analysis conducted in this paper leads to a rather negative conclusion about the 
possible social benefits of termination damages as a means of improving grower welfare.  
Breach damages appear to be least distortionary when there is minimal asset specificity, 
but this also happens to be the case when they are least needed because growers are not 
too vulnerable.  On the other hand, when asset specificity is large and growers are 
vulnerable, breach damages can be highly distortionary and may lead to unintended 
consequences that can increase the costs of managing of moral hazard and possibly lead   18
to reduced productivity.  Thus, policy makers face a conundrum as they must weigh the 
consequences of protecting one group at the expense of other sectors of the economy.  
  An issue that was not discussed but merits further research is that if increasing 
investments in I can enhance principal profits by lowering effort costs of agents, then 
processors may force growers to invest until their participation constraints are binding.  
Thus, even if breach damages can increase grower welfare, it is likely that processors can 
extract any welfare gains achieved by growers via more demanding investment 
requirements that benefit the processors but impose costs on growers.  
  Perhaps there are alternative means of protecting growers.  One possibility is for 
policy makers to focus on policies that can enhance growers’ reservation utilities.  For 
example, Lewin suggest that collective bargaining can be a “flexible” way of protecting 
growers and could enhance grower bargaining power.  This would suggest that legal rules 
that protect grower rights to organize collectively can indirectly enhance grower 
bargaining power.  Anti-trust policies that protect alternative marketing channels may 
also keep growers from being held hostage because of low reservation utilities.  This is an 
important area of future research for agricultural economists.  
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Appendix 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: Parts (i) and (ii) follow trivially from (16) and the assumption of 
limited liability.   To prove part (iii), using the logic used to derive (9), the one shot 














 which is greater 
than (17).  Because it is now cheaper to provide effort incentives, the principal 
implements a higher level of effort and moves closer to the first best level.  
 
 
Proof of Proposition 2:  From (23), we can construct the incentive cost function for the 
principal, 
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Which can be substituted into the principal’s objective function to get: 
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However, this is identical to (18) so that the effort level the principal chooses to 
implement is identical to the effort level specified in equation (19).  Similarly, the 
incentive cost function can be substituted into the grower profit function (22) to show that 
the presence of breach damages does not affect grower profit.  
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.   Note that the incentive cost 
function with damages is now given by, 
. 1
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, so we can easily see that 
ˆ DD ≥ and the last term in the principal’s objective function,  1 ˆ ()( 1 ) p ev D D δ  −−   must 
be non-negative which implies that the principal faces incentive costs that are higher than 
incentive costs without regulation.  Consequently, it must be true that the optimal effort 
level chosen under Case 2, which we denote as 
2
1
D e , must be less than or equal to  1 e  .   
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.  In 
this case, even without government regulation, the principal’s incentive is simply  
.
1
IC D CL = .  Substituting this into the principal’s objective function (22) yields, 
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Now, using (21), we can substitute for D to get: 
(D.3)  
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 in (19) has been replaced by  12 2 2 () ( |) ( )
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 since v < 1.  Thus, letting 
3
1
D e  denote the 
effort level that maximizes (D.3), we have 
3
11
D ee <  . 